As the
curtain rises for the second Obama presidential term, the immediate
foreign policy priority will be the smooth withdrawal of US-led troops
from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and ensuring that the
insurgency-scarred country does not descend into complete chaos. There
is no gainsaying the importance and centrality of Pakistan in this
enterprise.
It is undoubtedly in Islamabad’s own interest to skilfully
employ whatever leverage it still has with the Afghan groups to persuade
them to sort out their differences at the negotiating table, as only
that will stave off the hideous possibility of civil war.
Last month, on Eid-ul-Azha, Mullah Omar issued a statement which
commentators here believe indicated “important policy shifts.” None of
them bothered to scratch the surface which would have demonstrated that,
like all weak-minded men, the supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban lays
an exaggerated emphasis on not changing his mind. He is convinced that,
as the amir-ul-momineen (commander of the faithful), he is the
undisputed ruler of Afghanistan for the rest of his life and any
settlement of the conflict must be on his terms. This was the impression
I gathered after several meetings with him from 1996 to 2000.
Those were fretful years in which I was involved in a shuttle mission
aimed at persuading the Afghan groups to terminate their hostilities and
agree on a mechanism for establishing a broad-based government
reflecting the ethnic mosaic of the country. Some of these travels were
life-threatening, and, on one occasion we survived narrowly as our
aircraft was about to be shot down by the Northern Alliance over the
skies of Mazar-e-Sharif. The incident was later recounted by Saleh Zafir
of the Jang Group and Z A Qureshi of Pakistan Television who
accompanied me on that eventful flight. Afghanistan has changed little
since then, and the country continues to be ravaged by internal
conflict.
In his Eid-ul-Azha message Mullah Omar has
again affirmed: “We do not intend to grab power and nor, after the exit
of foreign forces, [want to ignite] a civil war. Our efforts are centred
on a political system that is in the hands of Afghans” free from
external interference. This was more or less a rehash of his Eid-ul-Fitr
message in August last year which was the most exhaustive statement he
has ever made. In that message, which reads more like a papal
encyclical, he announced: “The policy of the Islamic Emirate is not
aimed at monopolising power since Afghanistan is the joint homeland of
all Afghans,” and all citizens have the right to play a role in the
“running of the country.”
Less than a month later,
Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former Afghan president and the chief of the
High Peace Council, was killed in Kabul by suicide bombers from one of
the Taliban groups. His grief-stricken daughter, Fatima, reminisced how
tragically ironical it was that only a week earlier, her father, a
mild-mannered professor of theology, had attended a conference in Tehran
on “Islamic Awakening” where “he had appealed to the ulema (religious
scholars) to issue a fatwa (decree) against suicide bombings.”
The assassination, despite Mullah Omar’s assurances that he had no
intention of “monopolising power,” is just one of many instances that
shows how fractured the Taliban movement has become. Commanders act
independently and ignore the orders of their supreme leader with
ill-disguised disdain. This was glaringly apparent in the manner that
Taliban fighters have violated the solemn pledges enshrined in the
constitution promulgated by Mullah Omar. The main features of the
document were published in the August 3, 2010, issue of Azadi, a
Quetta-based newspaper.
The 35-page constitution, which
contains 14 chapters and 85 clauses, stresses that jihad must be
strictly in accordance with Islamic principles and “every mujahid” (holy
warrior) is obliged to go the extra mile to “win a place in the hearts
of the people...so that they have the prayers of the people with them.”
Three days later the bodies of 10 men and women, all medical aid
workers, were discovered by Afghan police in the northern province of
Badakshan.
Another clause ordains that captured foreign
troops must never be treated as hostages and, therefore, their release
“in exchange for money is strictly forbidden.” The same paragraph
enjoins the provision of “good facilities to the prisoners” and
prohibits any form of torture, particularly the “cutting off of ears,
noses and lips.” Five days later, the mutilated remains of two US
Marines who had been captured by the Taliban the previous month in Logar
province were recovered by the International Security Assistance Force
in Afghanistan (Isaf).
The document emphatically asserts
that informers and spies must not even be arrested, or harmed, without
their being made aware of Islamic teachings and given an opportunity to
repent. This did not stop the public hanging of a seven-year-old boy on
preposterous charges of espionage. Around this time international media
outlets carried unconfirmed reports that the Taliban leadership had
instructed their fighters to kill or capture Afghan nationals, even
women, if they cooperated with Isaf.
These ghastly
incidents, despite the assurances in the constitution promulgated by the
self-styled amir-ul-momineen, show that his authority is gradually
being eroded. This was also conceded in March last year by his close
confidante, Mullah Zabiullah, who said that the Taliban movement was in
the throes of an unprecedented leadership crisis.
But
despite this, Mullah Omar is by far the most powerful leader of
Pakhtun-dominated southern and eastern Afghanistan, and all efforts to
promote a settlement will have to be negotiated through his designated
representatives. In his Eid-ul-Azha message he stated: “...we have
established a specific office and a separate political panel...I wish to
make it clear that besides that specific office, we have no other
outlet for any reconciliation or political dialogue.” This is the same
“committee” for the purpose of “making external and internal policies”
that was envisaged in the constitution two years earlier.
Against this backdrop, Washington believes that Pakistan can play a
pivotal role for the orderly withdrawal of US troops and the eventual
stabilisation of Afghanistan. It is therefore probably not coincidental
that in the last few days the US Special Envoy for Pakistan and
Afghanistan Marc Grossman, the State Department spokesperson Victoria
Nuland and Deputy Chief of the American embassy in Islamabad Richard
Hoagland, have publicly affirmed that the Durand Line is the recognised
international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
These pronouncements at this point in time are intriguing. In 2007,
when Pakistan toyed with the idea of fencing its border with
Afghanistan, former president Pervez Musharraf was discreetly but firmly
advised by the Bush administration to abandon the project, as it would
undermine the Karzai regime. The change in Washington’s declaratory
policy on the Durand Line is therefore significant. Whatever the reason
for this, it is vitally important for Pakistan to craft
well-thought-through initiatives aimed at facilitating an intra-Afghan
dialogue. The alternative is the intensification of the conflict in
Afghanistan, which will have horrendous implications for the security
situation in the adjacent tribal regions of Pakistan.
But persuading the Afghan groups to talk to each other has never been
easy. A top-ranking foreign ministry official recently said that Mullah
Omar was as “damned and elusive as the Scarlet Pimpernel” of Baroness
Orczy’s literary masterpiece and there had been absolutely no contact
with him for several months. One can only hope that he was lying through
his teeth. The supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban has always prided
himself on being a man of his word. His ideas for a settlement are spelt
out in the constitution he promulgated in 2010, his Eid-ul-Fitr message
of August 2011 and his recent statement on Eid-ul-Azha. These documents
warrant serious study as they constitute a framework for negotiations
among the Afghan factions.
The writer is the publisher of Criterion quarterly. Email: iftimurshed@ gmail.com