The imminent US/Nato drawdown in Afghanistan poses major
challenges for Pakistan and the region: how best to work towards the
peace and stability desired by all?
Clearly, America acknowledges
its failure to fulfil neither Bush’s transformative ambitions, nor
Obama’s lowered expectations, though the US/Nato occupation has attained
some objectives. President Hamid Karzai’s government remains, urban
areas are largely controlled, and some development has resulted; the
Afghan National Army and Police have been established for post-Nato
national security.
Even these achievements are incomplete
however. The government is beset by corruption and weakness; the Taliban
dominate much rural territory, especially in the south and south-east;
development is uneven; the security forces are insufficiently trained
and riddled with desertions. The army or police forces’ cost too appears
prohibitive in the current climate of unenthusiastic external funding.
Despite
the avowed US/Nato/Karzai objectives of peace and reconciliation, there
has been no progress due to the continued American reliance on the
military option and the Karzai government and its different interest
groups’ priority of remaining in power. Rather than offering anything
concrete to the Taliban and other groups resisting occupation, their
basic demand for all foreign forces to quit their country has been
countered by the US-Afghanistan strategic agreement. The impending
American elections may enhance serious negotiations; plus factoring in
Pakistan’s pivotal position therein, recognised both by the US and
(albeit reluctantly) by Afghanistan.
Assumed scenarios vary
between the Taliban takeover; the country’s division between north-west
and south-east; and the continuous internal conflict, as after the
Soviet exit. Presently, given Karzai’s considerable external support
(US/Nato, Iran, India, and Russia) and internal anti-Taliban backing, an
immediate Taliban takeover appears improbable, though not impossible.
Unrest - of whatever depth, dimension or duration - is almost certain!
The
Taliban’s previous stint in power may prevent their repeating previous
mistakes. Globally, their denying space to al-Qaeda or any terrorist
elements shall be the touchstone by which they are judged. The hallmark
of Afghanistan’s historical stability, an acknowledged mosaic of ethnic
groups or regions co-existing in a decentralised structure - with
mechanisms such as the loya jirga, may yet be achieved by the Afghan
groups given:
Total external troop withdrawal.
Combat and other fatigue factors.
While
a peaceful, stable Afghanistan is important regionally and
internationally, no country other than the long-suffering Afghan nation
itself is affected as directly as is Pakistan. The Pak-Afghan relations
have been difficult since 1947, but the blowback from the US/Nato
occupation has impacted Pakistan seriously and multi-sectorally re:
border insecurity, nationwide outrage, enhanced extremism/terrorism,
attempted destabilisation of Fata/Balochistan via Afghanistan, and a
burdened economy. The return of three million Afghan refugees, though
unrecognised by US/Nato, is a Pakistani prerequisite for any viable
peace settlement.
How then should Pakistan respond? One school of
thought advocates an absolutely “hands off” policy; that no favourites
be cultivated in Afghanistan, and any assistance towards peace or
reconciliation be accorded only if asked. The school of realists agrees
that there should be no favourites, but recognises that, given myriad
historical, geographic and ethnic linkages straddling a 2,600 km border,
association is unavoidable. It is in fact Pakistan, which provides
“strategic depth” to Afghanistan.
The Indian involvement in
Afghanistan - beginning with its support to irredentist border claims -
has been to pressure Pakistan. India is unlikely to replace the US/Nato
superstructure, or enable a two-front threat to Pakistan. The clear and
present danger is the fact that India has been using Afghanistan to
mount destabilisation attempts against Pakistan in Balochistan and Fata.
Even with the best of Pakistan’s “hands off” intentions towards
Afghanistan, India remains a spoiler unless it stays within the role of
legitimate economic assistance.
Pakistan should maintain and
wherever possible expand existing linkages with all peoples/parts of
Afghanistan. Up to 70,000 Afghans legally enter Pakistan daily for
different reasons. Pakistan is implementing major ($330 million)
medical, roads and educational projects for Afghanistan. Ninety percent
of Afghans seeking treatment abroad obtain it free of cost in Pakistani
government hospitals. Trade is encouraging. Formal figures for exports
from Pakistan to Afghanistan amount to $2 billion annually, and informal
flows may be closer to $5 billion. Pakistan has also sustained a
systematic programme of communication and contact with all political
parties and leaders in Afghanistan.
Pakistan should
simultaneously prepare to mitigate the fallout of a likely, long civil
war in Afghanistan, including by preventing another influx of refugees.
The 2007 proposal to fence or selectively mine the border must be
pursued; the primary aim to deter illegal immigration, terrorists or
armed groups, narcotics smuggling, and the secondary objective to
demonstrate Pakistan’s determination to interdict terrorists or
disruptive forces. Both India and Iran have built barriers on their
borders with Pakistan.
Nato’s exit from Afghanistan and the
ensuing military vacuum shall inevitably encourage the Taliban in
Afghanistan and the anti-state Taliban in Pakistan likewise. We have
thus to prepare lines of defence on the border and further inland. The
evidence from the recent PTI Waziristan march, that the limited routes
used by terrorists or criminals can be secured for legitimate traffic,
needs to be utilised - consistently and comprehensively - countrywide.
Bilaterally,
the TAPI gas pipeline project begun in the mid 90s must be restarted.
It is vital for Pakistan’s energy security, and starting work would
demonstrate the benefits of a peace dividend to the Afghans. As a
project, which would assist stability in Afghanistan, it should be
supported by the major powers.
In addition, the US with its
declared objectives of assisting in Pakistan’s energy situation can do
much in this regard, particularly as it opposes the natural gas pipeline
from Iran and also Pakistan’s civil nuclear programme.
In regard
to the US, Pakistan has supplied for over a decade the oxygen for the
US/Nato occupation. However, it has not been able to sufficiently
leverage its critical role and, perhaps, this possibility was limited.
For the Nato withdrawal phase, it has been estimated that there are some
200,000 containers and 50,000 wheeled vehicles that need to be taken
out of Afghanistan and for which the route through Pakistan remains
logistically shorter and more economical. How to make proper use of this
dependence in the bilateral relationship should begin to occupy the
minds of Pakistani policy planners.
Pakistan’s ability to
influence US policy on Afghanistan and, indeed, in South Asia is
limited. But when it disagrees, it should so state clearly without any
ambiguity. For Pakistan, in the face of the USA’s growing
multidimensional strategic partnership with India, finding ways to
maintain engagement and relevance with the US, while also focusing on
putting its house in order, growing the economy and deepening links with
China, Russia, the Gulf and other countries, is essential. Thinking
through what needs to be done and then actual implementation or
“delivery” in multilateral parlance, remains an institutional and
capacity weakness that needs to be addressed in all fields.
In
conclusion, it can be said that Pakistan has to prudently plan to assist
the Afghan peace and reconciliation effort when asked to do so by the
Afghans, deepen people-to-people links, focus on mutually beneficial
projects such as the gas pipeline; and simultaneously plan to meet all
eventualities, if progress towards stability in Afghanistan is slow or
non-existent to begin with as appears increasingly likely.
The writer is a former Pakistani diplomat. Email: ambassador.tariqosmanhyder@gmail.com