None of the standard and respected works on Pakistan’s economy make
reference to Afghanistan; for instance, the books by Parvez Hasan and
Ishrat Husain on Pakistan’s economic development between 1947 and 1997.
The omission seems surprising when we look back at the country’s economy
and reflect on its future from the perspective of the closing months of
2012
. There is no doubt that Pakistan’s economic future will be heavily
influenced by the way Afghanistan settles down after the American pull-out. President Barack Obama’s re-election may even hasten the process. Once the Americans depart, what will they leave behind?
We can contemplate two extreme possibilities, each of which will have
enormous consequences for Pakistan. On one end of the probability
spectrum, it can be assumed that the country will settle down after the
withdrawal of foreign troops. Most of the violence is directed at
foreign troops and the Afghans that support them. According to this
scenario, various segments of the diverse Afghan society will find a way
of working with one another, preferably, within a political framework
that will be representative and durable. Once politically settled, the
Afghans will begin to rebuild their war-ravaged economy, reduce
dependence on foreign support and exploit the country’s enormous mineral
potential. A Pentagon study estimated the potential of mineral deposits
at one trillion dollars. It covers a number of minerals, including
iron, copper, gold and platinum. Some of the mineral veins extend into
Pakistan, especially in the country’s south. There is considerable
foreign interest in getting to these deposits and foreign involvement
will draw Afghanistan even closer to Pakistan.
If we move to the other side of the probability spectrum, a very grim
picture could be painted about Afghanistan’s future. According to this,
the civil war that followed the pull-out by the Soviet Union
will look like a picnic when the United States and its allies leave.
The assumption that a very large Afghan force of more than 300,000
soldiers will be able to take charge of security will prove to be highly
optimistic. There are already signs that the force that has been built
up by the Americans, working with their European allies, may not have
the cohesiveness and have it remain loyal to the state. Instead, the
moment the American umbrella is removed, we will see this force
fracture.
Washington’s promise to pay $1.4 billion a year to sustain a large
force will not amount to much after the pull-out is complete. The
Americans are faced with a serious fiscal problem, in which all
expenditures are being looked at to reduce the enormous burden of debt
the economy carries. Providing such a large amount of support to Afghanistan
for a long period of time will be one of the first commitments to fall
by the wayside. Heavily armed men not certain that they will continue to
receive their salaries will begin to seek the support of the numerous
warlords in various parts of the country. If the Soviet Union’s
departure resulted in a civil war with half a dozen contenders, there
will be many more this time around. The conflict among them will be
bloodier than the war that ended with the triumph of the Taliban in
1996. This time, the Taliban will be one of the active participants in
the fight from the very beginning. The northern and central areas will
come under the control of other social and ethnic groups. The Tajiks and
the Uzbeks will control the northeast and the groups that have the
support of Iran will dominate the west. This possible division of
Afghanistan into three parts will create an extremist state right on the
border with Pakistan. That state will continue using its ideological
force to destabilise the areas south of the border, which will have
serious economic and political consequences for the state and the people
of Pakistan.
Which way Afghanistan goes will matter for Pakistan. Those who have
chronicled Pakistan’s economic past may have overlooked Afghanistan as a
contributing factor.