Taking issue
The writer is Jang Group/Geo advisor on political affairs and host of Aapas Ki Baat on Geo TV
An
extraordinary and unprecedented situation prevails in the province of
Balochistan. On the surface, it is demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s
October 12 interim order that censures the three core power-brokers –
the federal government, the military authorities as represented by the
FC, Corps HQ, MI and ISI, and the provincial government – for various
omissions and commissions that have laid the province low, and nails the
provincial government for having lost its “constitutional right to
rule”. Underlying the crisis, however, are four distinct and
contradictory developments that all power-wielders, including the SC,
are loath to address.
The first is the secular separatist
movement of Baloch nationalists that was triggered by the rigged
pro-Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal elections in the province in 2002 and
fuelled by the senseless killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti some years later.
This led to insurgent attacks on security forces and ethnic Punjabis in
the province and pulled the military and its intelligence agencies into
the fray, in turn leading to classic counter-insurgency operations
involving unlawful “disappearances”, state-sponsored anti-insurgent
lashkars and large scale repression. But the dialectic of the modern
nation-state is such that, as long as the unconstitutional insurgency
rages, the security establishment will not abandon its unconstitutional
counter-insurgency doctrines and methods.
The second is
the increasing madrassa-isation or Talibanisation in the province owing
to its proximity to Mullah Omar’s Taliban strongholds in southern
Afghanistan, which poses a different but equally lethal threat to the
stability of the province, both in ethnic terms (the Taliban are
Pakhtuns and the nationalists are Baloch) and in political philosophy
(the Taliban are Islamic extremists opposed to the US presence in the
region and its puppet Karzai regime, while the Baloch nationalists are
secular and openly inclined to seek American, and Karzai’s, assistance
in pursuit of their separatist goals). But as long as this regional
matrix remains, Balochistan will continue to slide into political
anarchy.
The third is the persistence of the tribal
system in which big and small Baloch sardars and nawabs – reeking of
corruption and incompetence – compete for the spoils of office with
avaricious and self-righteous Pakhtun mullahs to enlarge their
opportunist and ideological agendas respectively. But as long as ethnic
passions, the local tribal system and ideological divides persist, there
will be no progress in the province.
The fourth is the
twist in the tale: the military’s “national security agenda” for
Pakistan and the region, in which Islamist non-state actors of certain
shades have a role to play in the perceived solution and secularists and
democrats are equal parts of the perceived problem. But as long as the
military is unaccountably obsessed with its regional “enemy and friends”
thesis in a particularly narrow definition of “national interests”,
there will be no reprieve.
The SC’s October 12 order seems
to acknowledge some such problematic elements and seeks to show the way
forward. But it fails to comprehend the multidimensional and
interlinking nature of the crisis. That is why, with demonstrably good
intentions, it has ended up creating a “constitutional crisis” without
offering any enduring political solutions. Consider.
The
October 12 judgment makes several interventions. (1) It says the
provincial government has failed to protect the fundamental rights of
its citizens (law and order, and security) and has, therefore, forfeited
its constitutional right to rule and cannot be allowed to continue as a
silent spectator to such abuses. (2) It says the federal government has
failed to help establish “rule of law” in the province, despite sending
in the military to assist the provincial government and that neither
government has exercised a range of options available to them singly and
collectively.
(3) It says the federal government must
ensure “immediate constitutional action to provide security to the
people” – (a) by ending overt and covert military operations, directly
by the FC and the agencies and indirectly by the tribal lashkars
patronised by them; (b) by rehabilitating displaced persons and
compensating families of those killed or disappeared; (c) by tightening
customs controls over smuggling, especially of vehicles subsequently
used in crime; (d) by prohibiting issuance of illegal SIM cards used in
crime; (e) by persuading the media not to publish material that incites
violence and hatred; (f) by tightening up on corruption among
politicians and bureaucrats in the province; (g) by opting for a
constitutional amendment to address the sense of economic deprivation in
the province; and (h) by holding transparently free and fair general
elections that enable alienated nationalist elements to return to
mainstream politics.
The administrative options have been
clearly spelt out. But the provincial government is unable to implement
them. Therefore the SC wants the government thrown out and a “better”
one ushered in via new elections or Governor’s Rule (implied). But
there’s the rub.
To be sure, the SC has the authority to
judge whether an action is unconstitutional or not. It can do so on the
basis of a petition by any citizen or the provincial or federal
governments. But it cannot transgress the limits of its power by making
such a determination off its own bat or by insisting on any particular
solution to the violation of certain constitutional provisions. In this
case, even if the provincial government has lost its “constitutional
credibility” to rule as per the SC, only the provincial parliament or
president, on the advice of the prime minister, can change the status
quo.
Indeed, in such cases, the determination of the
constitutional credibility and right to rule of any government is the
exclusive domain of the parliament and the SC can only be asked to step
in to challenge or uphold the parliament’s view. It is unprecedented for
the courts to demand the ouster of a democratically elected government
without recourse to parliament. If this order were to be implemented,
what is to stop the SC from sacking governments at will for ostensible
constitutional reasons and ordering elections, thereby usurping the
prerogatives of parliament?
There is a second equally
problematic aspect of the SC’s order. How will a new round of elections
automatically solve the problem of Balochistan even if the estranged
nationalists were given a level playing field? First, there is no
assurance so far that the insurgents are ready to abandon their armed
struggle for an independent Balochistan. Second, in view of the four
factors outlined above, there is no assurance that a stable, competent
and clean provincial parliament will emerge where Pakhtun Islamists
linked to the military and secular nationalists alienated from it will
rub shoulders with each other and woo a coterie of traditional tribal
politicians who swing both ways and are constantly blackmailing and
destabilising governments for mundane reasons. Finally, asking for a
constitutional amendment to resolve Balochistan’s economic problems
assumes a particular national consensus in the federating units and
political parties simultaneously, when both are hostage to blackmail and
unstable politics in an era of coalition governments.
General
elections are around the corner. There is an independent Election
Commission that should ensure a level playing field for all in
Balochistan. Therefore, there will be occasion soon enough to test the
SC’s recipe for restoration of fundamental rights and political
accountability. In the meanwhile, both the provincial and federal
governments should address the issues raised by the SC. But the SC would
do grievous harm to the constitution if it were to cripple the
provincial government by significantly restraining it from functioning
at the behest of its own parliament or insist on its sacking by the
federal government and its replacement by Governor’s Rule.
Email: najamsethi@hotmail.com