On an
invitation by Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, Afghanistan’s High
Peace Council was to send a delegation to Pakistan months ago, but it
was delayed until now. One apparent reason for the delay was Kabul’s
concern that the visit won’t be able to achieve anything unless
Islamabad was able to persuade the Taliban to agree to direct talks with
the Afghan government.
As the situation hasn’t
changed a bit and the possibility of talks between the Taliban and the
Afghan government is still improbable, the trip by the High Peace
Council head Salahuddin Rabbani and his delegation to Pakistan is
unlikely to achieve anything worth the effort.
The visit,
however, is somewhat important because it is the first by Salahuddin
Rabbani to Pakistan as the chairman of the council after having
succeeded his father, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was killed in a
suicide attack allegedly carried out by the Taliban in Kabul on
September 20 last year. The younger Rabbani, though, isn’t new to
Pakistan as he lived in Peshawar for a number of years along with his
family during the Afghan jihad and is familiar with the country and its
people. It would still be unrealistic to attach too many hopes to the
visit in view of the ground realities.
In April 2012,
President Hamid Karzai appointed Salahuddin Rabbani as the chairman of
the 70-member High Peace Council, which has achieved little in its
two-year existence. His appointment was primarily due to political and
emotional reasons as he happened to be the eldest son and successor of
the slain leader of the Jamiat-i-Islami, a religio-political party of
mostly ethnic Tajiks who, after having fought the Taliban for years, was
willing to negotiate peace with the Pakhtun-dominated, Mullah Mohammad
Omar-led Islamic movement.
The late Rabbani had also
undertaken a trip to Islamabad in the hope of contacting the Taliban
leaders hiding in Pakistan, and had returned empty-handed. The same
could happen to Salahuddin Rabbani unless the Taliban leadership is
persuaded to make a fundamental shift in its policy of not recognising
the Afghan government and refusing to interact with it at any level.
That
seems unlikely at this stage and one could, therefore, say even before
the Afghan delegation sets foot in Pakistan that the visit will be an
exercise in futility. All Pakistan can do at present is arrange a
meeting of Salahuddin Rabbani with the detained Afghan Taliban leader
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and others, or hand them over to Kabul, but
this won’t solve the problem because Mullah Omar has a standing policy
that no Taliban figure can negotiate on behalf of his movement unless
specifically assigned this role. Detained Taliban leaders certainly
cannot represent Mullah Omar and his movement in any talks of such an
importance.
A number of things need to happen before one
can become optimistic about the possibility of a dialogue between the
Afghan government and the Taliban. The US, as the patron of the biggest
military and economic assistance to the Karzai government, holds the key
to break the stalemate because Kabul would have to be empowered to take
decisions that would convince the Taliban that President Karzai or his
High Peace Council aren’t powerless. Following President Barack Obama’s
re-election, his administration could consider restarting the stalled
Qatar peace process with the Taliban and investing more time and
resources into finding a political, instead of a military, solution to
the Afghan conflict.
The US would have to play an
instrumental role in removing the names of Mullah Omar and other Taliban
leaders from the UN ‘black-list’ so that they could travel and possibly
enter into negotiations with the US and the Afghan government in
future. It would also have to take back its announcement of head-money
placed on the Taliban leaders to make any peace talks meaningful. One of
the most important confidence-building measures would be to free
Taliban prisoners in Guantanamo Bay and Bagram, not unconditionally but
as part of a swap for the US soldier, Bowe Bergdahl, who is in custody
of the Haqqani network, for the last three years. Obviously, the Taliban
too have to make some concessions if all this were to happen.
Kabul
could also argue that the Taliban are powerless and that Islamabad
holds the key to overcome the impasse, but it seems it is being
unrealistic with regard to Pakistan’s influence over Mullah Omar and his
Rahbari Shura, or Leadership Council. Islamabad certainly has some
influence over the Taliban as a number of their leaders are based in
Pakistan, but this isn’t of a decisive nature. And any coercive move by
Pakistan to dictate terms to the Taliban could harm its own interest,
alienate Mullah Omar and his men from Islamabad and even force them to
take a more hard-line stance on ending the Afghan conflict.
Why
would Pakistan apprehend and keep in its custody Taliban leaders,
around 30 according to Taliban sources, including important ones like
the movement’s deputy head Mullah Baradar, his predecessor Mullah
Obaidullah who died in the custody of the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI), late Maulvi Yunis Khalis’ son Anwarul Haq Mujahid and Ustad
Mohammad Yasir, if it was sure of its control over the Taliban movement?
Why did Pakistan hand over some Taliban leaders such as former interior
minister and Guantanamo Bay prison detainee Khairullah Khairkhwa to the
US and several others, including Akbar Agha and Ustad Yasir, to the
Afghan government if it wanted to unconditionally oblige the Taliban? In
fact, an element of distrust exists between Pakistan and the Afghan
Taliban due to past events and also in context of future scenarios in
the region. This cannot bode well for the stability of the Pak-Afghan
border areas.
It is also important to defuse the tension
on the Durand Line border between Afghanistan and Pakistan before
expecting the two countries to sincerely cooperate with each other to
end the Afghan conflict, restore peace and fight terrorism. Infiltration
by militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan is still a problem, and
since 2011 cross-border attacks by Afghanistan-based Pakistani Taliban
led by Maulana Fazlullah into Chitral, Upper Dir and Lower Dir districts
and Bajaur tribal region have contributed to the tense situation on the
Durand Line. On the other hand, India’s growing influence in
Afghanistan has been causing unease in Pakistan.
In fact,
the timing of Salahuddin Rabbani’s visit to Pakistan has coincided with
President Karzai’s trip to India and the signing of four more
agreements of cooperation in various fields. Although Afghanistan as a
sovereign country has every right to take any decision regarding its
foreign relations, Islamabad has reasons to become concerned when its
offer of further cooperation with Kabul is rebuffed. There is a growing
feeling in Pakistan that Kabul has to show more sensitivity to
Islamabad’s concerns with regard to India’s role in Afghanistan.
No
doubt Afghanistan also has many complaints on Pakistan’s actions and
Islamabad certainly needs to do more to earn Kabul’s trust. Unless the
two neighbouring countries start trusting each other, one-off visits
like the recent one by Prime Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf to Afghanistan
and that of the High Peace Council to Pakistan won’t achieve anything
substantial in terms of ending the Afghan conflict.
The writer is resident editor of The News in Peshawar.Email: rahimyusufzai@yahoo.com