Omnishambles! This word aptly describes the current status
of the USA‘s Afghan campaign! All the major decision makers, the power
players, the movers and shakers of this ill-fated military expedition
are on their way out - albeit for vastly different reasons.
The
Secretaries of State and Defence are opting out of their jobs. The
Director CIA has admittedly faltered, while commander Isaf is being
investigated. And the strategic situation in the Afghan Theatre of War
(ATW) is far from positive.
There is clearly a crisis of leadership here. Who, then, is actually running this tottering show?
The
USA’s Afghan campaign has, perhaps, entered the most critical stage. It
is floundering and needs intricate handling. The US President must
decide on how to bring this costly Afghan (mis)adventure to an
acceptable closure without losing face, dominance, influence and clout
in this region and the world.
A strategic pause is thus
warranted. A new set of leaders at senior levels has to be decided upon
and given time to settle into their respective jobs. The campaign itself
needs a major reorientation of its strategic direction and a resetting
of its goals and objectives. These paradigm shifts will deal with its
winding down and the withdrawal of US/Nato/Isaf combine from the ATW,
leaving behind a pacified AfPak Region (APR). The thrust of future
US/Nato/Isaf operations may, therefore, undergo a very profound change
in context, content and nature.
President Barack Obama has many
divergent imperatives both at home and abroad to consider. One of his
foremost challenges at home will be to tackle the “Fiscal Cliff” and
balance the budget. He will be inclined to cut expenditures both at home
and abroad (military expeditions, Afghan campaign) and raise taxes to
reduce the national deficit.
President Obama would clearly want
to bring the Afghan campaign to a prompt and acceptable closure, but it
is beset with many intractable issues. Its mission is yet unfulfilled.
Al-Qaeda thrives in the APR and may have sneaked into the Arabian
Peninsula, North Africa, the Mediterranean region and even Europe and
continental USA. The Taliban and other militant groups have neither been
pacified, nor neutralised militarily. Incessant drone attacks continue
to kill innocent Pakistanis, fuel anti-Americanism and add to the ranks
of the militants!
The Pashtuns remain deprived of their
legitimate democratic rights. The Afghan economy remains in shambles.
The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) is largely ineffective and
untrustworthy. President Hamid Karzai and his government’s writ is
literally limited to Kabul. Issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan
remain unresolved.
Thus, the current strategic environment in the
APR is clearly not conducive to any sort of closure at this particular
point in time. Decisive steps, bold diplomatic initiatives and
calculated operational risks will have to be taken soon to create the
desired conditions in line with the US President’s expected vision for
2014 or even 2013!
Decision time is nigh! The US President has
some strategic options to choose from. He may leave behind a number of
strategically sited well provisioned military bases or he could
literally vacate the region totally!
He could also designate
India as the “regional cop” and ease it into a dominant role in
Afghanistan - an option pregnant with disastrous regional ramifications!
However, the US could actually adopt yet another policy option, a
workable and potentially win-win one! It could engage both India and
Pakistan, but for totally segregated, mutually exclusive roles. It could
engage Pakistan to take on the sole lead role in the APR. This might
bring Pakistan around, ensure stability and a fast reversion to peace
and prosperity in the region. The US could then engage India in the
Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific Regions to help secure its interests
there. Anyway, India does not have the clout or the credentials to do
both simultaneously. And even if it ventures into Afghanistan only, it
will have reasons to rue and regret that decision for generations to
come!
Regardless of what option the US President adopts, it will
have to be backed up by clear objectives, solid operational planning and
willing participation by Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The departure
of the top leadership of the Afghan campaign may actually force a
strategic pause onto President Obama. He will get the time to usher in a
new team and reconsider operational options. If he decides to win the
war militarily, then he will have to increase the levels of violence
manifold and concentrate/squeeze them into a very short span of time.
If
he decides to negotiate his way out of the region, then he will have to
get off his high horse and negotiate with the “terrorists” he despises!
If he intends to clobber and bludgeon them into submission and
then negotiate with them, then he will have to strike that critical
balance to avoid overkill and failure.
Regardless of what
methodology he adopts he will have to ‘gel’ Afghanistan and Pakistan
into a team with his country. And for that to happen he will have to,
first and foremost, win over Pakistan’s trust, confidence and willing
participation all over again!
Pakistan, on the other hand, must
seize the diplomatic initiative, as the US is forced into a reappraisal
of its policies towards the APR. It must build upon the talks held with
the Afghan High Peace Council and get into direct negotiations with
President Karzai and the militants too. It must not foreclose any
options.
It must help the US and its allies in pacifying the APR,
egressing safely and expeditiously from it and leaving behind a
mutually acceptable strategic environment. However, this must be
predicated upon a non-negotiable final resolution of the terrorist
problem. The loop must, of necessity, be closed either through
negotiations or decisive military action or both. Period.
The
final decisions have to be taken by the US President and promptly. He
will do well to co-opt the Pakistanis and the Afghans in his
pre-decision deliberations. Else he may find himself applying closure to
yet another failed and costly US military expedition!
The writer is a retired brigadier and a former defence attaché to Australia and New Zealand. Email: im_k@hotmail.com